Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | September 2024

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION: KEY FIGURES

Access to the north of Gaza

Humanitarian access to northern Gaza, which the Israeli forces have cut off from the south, was significantly and consistently hindered throughout September. Of the 667 movements planned by humanitarian partners, 91 required passage through an Israeli checkpoint to move between south and north, or vice versa. However, only 8 per cent of those 91 movements were facilitated by Israeli forces, while a combined 84 per cent were either denied or impeded access. In total, 49 per cent of movements failed to achieve any of their objectives, either due to outright denial or, despite initial approval, being unable to pass through the checkpoint due to prolonged delays or other challenges, including technical ones related to the functioning of the checkpoint gate. Despite there being two checkpoints between north and south, only one is operated at a time by Israeli forces (currently the one on Al Rasheed road), resulting in long delays and blockages. When technical issues do occur, no alternative is provided.

During the week commencing 24 September, humanitarian partners and contractors across various teams and organizations were stranded in the north for a total of 13 nights, combined among all movements, unable to cross back to the south. This disrupted other essential activities, tying up scarce resources, such as personnel and vehicles, which could not be used for other purposes.

Humanitarian access to northern Gaza is crucial for partners winterization activities, as adverse weather conditions will significantly increase humanitarian needs. It is essential that humanitarian partners are able to reach the north for planning purposes as well as for transporting and distributing vital aid.

Access challenges as a compounding factor for food insecurity

Issued in late August, the latest report by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network highlighted that a higher volume of humanitarian assistance in the first half of the year was successful in reducing the risk of famine (IPC 5) in Gaza, underscoring the critical importance of sustaining aid flows into and within the Gaza Strip. However, the supply of humanitarian goods has subsequently reduced and continues to face persistent obstruction. During the month of September, the World Food Programme was only able to deliver 41 per cent of its planned food commodities (11,334 metric tons delivered out of 27,904 metric tons planned), down from 58 per cent in August (13,964 metric tons delivered out of 23,828 metric tons planned).

There are limited crossing points into Gaza, and it is rare for all of them to be open simultaneously to receive goods. In the north, only Erez West/Zikim or Erez crossings are available, but they are not open at the same time. Moreover, messaging from Israeli authorities about the crossings has been inconsistent, creating confusion and making it difficult for organizations to plan the delivery of aid.

When the messaging was clarified, it specified that only modes such as the government to government (G2G) pipeline could be used for the entry of goods into northern Gaza. However, this modality was not feasible for most NGOs, limiting their ability to transport vital humanitarian supplies and severely hampering their operations.

The delivery of goods from Kerem Shalom/Karm Abu Salem into Gaza also continued to face significant challenges. Conflict-induced criminality has rendered the only route provided by Israeli forces out of the terminal increasingly dangerous for transporting humanitarian goods. Contractors have pulled out of moving humanitarian goods and commodities due to security concerns for their staff. Humanitarian partners have been forced to drastically reduce their operations on that road, to not compromise the “do no harm” principle by exposing aid to looting and violence or otherwise contributing to negative conflict dynamics or criminal activity.

During the month, Israeli authorities continued to deny requests to assess or test alternative routes for deliveries from Kerem Shalom/Karm Abu Salem. Efforts to ease restrictions on the use of the external Fence Road were similarly unsuccessful. For example, humanitarian partners submitted lists of additional drivers for vetting to use the Fence Road, but these were not cleared by the relevant Israeli authorities, leaving only a small number of authorized drivers. Humanitarian agencies have also proposed various alternative routes and operational adjustments to facilitate the safe collection of cargo from the platform, including measures to ensure high-value items remain on the area of Kerem Shalom which enables them to be uplifted via the Fence Road. However, these suggestions have been never implemented. A range of complementary measures is ultimately needed to ensure the safe and efficient movement of humanitarian goods and commodities, so that aid reaches communities in Gaza in a timely manner.